bunchberry

@bunchberry@lemmy.world

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨I'm good, thanks⁩ ⁨⁨1⁩ ⁨hour⁩ ago⁩:

  Depends upon what you mean by realism. If you just mean belief in a physical reality independent of a conscious observer, I am not really of the opinion you need MWI to have a philosophically realist perspective.

  For some reason, everyone intuitively accepts the relativity of time and space in special relativity as an ontological feature of the world, but when it comes to the relativity of the quantum state, people’s brains explode and they start treating it like it has to do with “consciousness” or “subjectivity” or something and that if you accept it then you’re somehow denying the existence of objective reality. I have seen this kind of mentality throughout the literature and it has never made sense to me.

  Even Eugene Wigner did this, when he proposed the “Wigner’s friend” thought experiment, he points out how two different observers can come to describe the same system differently, and then concludes that proves quantum mechanics is deeply connected to “consciousness.” But we have known that two observers can describe the same system differently since Galileo first introduced the concept of relativity back in 1632. There is no reason to take it as having anything to do with consciousness or subjectivity or anything like that.

  (You can also treat the wavefunction nomologically as well, and then the nomological behavior you’d expect from particles would be relative, but the ontological-nomological distinction is maybe getting too much into the weeds of philosophy here.)

  I am partial to the way the physicist Francois-Igor Pris puts it. Reality exists as independently of the conscious observer, but not independently from context. You have to specify the context in which you are making an ontological claim for it to have physical meaning. This context can be that of the perspective of a conscious observer, but nothing about the observer is intrinsic here, what is intrinsic is the context, and that is just one of many possible contexts an ontological claim can be made. Two observers can describe the same train to be traveling at different velocities, not because they are conscious observers, but because they are describing the same train from different contexts.

  The philosopher Jocelyn Benoist and the physicist Francois-Igor Pris have argued that the natural world does have a kind of an inherent observer-observed divide but that these terms are misleading being “subject” tends to imply a human subject and “observer” tends to imply a conscious observer, and that a lot of the confusion is cleared up once you figure out how to describe this divide in a more neutral, non-anthropomorphic way, which they settle on talking about the “reality” and the “context.” The reality of the velocity of the train will be different in different contexts. You don’t have to invoke “observer-dependence” to describe relativity. Hence, you can indeed describe quantum theory as a theory of physical reality independent of the observer.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨I'm good, thanks⁩ ⁨⁨2⁩ ⁨hours⁩ ago⁩:

  MWI very specifically commits to the existence of a universal wavefunction. Everett’s original paper is literally titled “The Theory of the Universal Wavefunction.” If you instead only take relative states seriously, that position is much closer to relational quantum mechanics. In fact, Carlo Rovelli explicitly describes RQM as adopting Everett’s relative-state idea while rejecting the notion of a universal quantum state.

  MWI claims there exists a universal quantum state, but quantum theory works perfectly well without this assumption if quantum states are taken to be fundamentally relative. Every quantum state is defined in relation to something else, which is made clear by the Wigner’s friend scenario where different observers legitimately assign different states to the same system. If states are fundamentally relative, then a “universal” quantum state makes about as much sense as a “universal velocity” in Galilean relativity.

  You could arbitrarily choose a reference frame in Galilean relativity and declare it universal, but this requires an extra postulate, is unnecessary for the theory, and is completely arbitrary. Likewise, you could pick some observer’s perspective and call that the universal wavefunction, but there is no non-arbitrary reason to privilege it. That wavefunction would still be relative to that observer, just with special status assigned by fiat.

  Worse, such a perspective could never truly be universal because it could not include itself. To do that you would need another external perspective, leading to infinite regress. You never obtain a quantum state that includes the entire universe. Any state you define is always relative to something within the universe, unless you define it relative to something outside of the universe, but at that point you are talking about God and not science.

  The analogy to Galilean relativity actually is too kind. Galilean relativity relies on Euclidean space as a background, allowing an external viewpoint fixed to empty coordinates. Hilbert space is not a background space at all; it is always defined in terms of physical systems. You can transform perspectives in spacetime, but there is no transformation to a background perspective in Hilbert space because no such background exists. The closet that exists is a statistical transformation to different perspectives within Liouville space, but this only works for objects within the space; you cannot transform to the perspective of the background itself as it is not a background space.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨I'm good, thanks⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨hours⁩ ago⁩:
  1. Entanglement is just a mathematical property of the theory. If it is sufficient to explain measurement then there is not anything particularly unique about MWI since you can employ this explanation within anything. You also say I missed your point by repeating exactly what I said.
  2. You’re the one giving this bullet point list as if you are debunking all of my points one-by-one. If you agree there is nothing especially “more local” about MWI than any other interpretation then why not just ignore that point and move on?
  3. A relative state is not an entangled state. Again you need to read the papers I linked. We are talking about observer-dependence in the sense of how the velocity of a train in Galilean relativity can be said to have a different value simultaneously for two different observers. I drew the direct comparison here in order to explain that in my first comment. This isn’t about special relativity or general relativity, but about “relativity” in a more abstract sense of things which are only meaningfully defined as a relational property between systems. The quantum state observer A assigns to a system can be different from the quantum state observer B assigns to the system (see the Wigner’s friend thought experiment). The quantum state in quantum mechanics is clearly relative in this sense, and to claim there is a universal quantum state requires an additional leap which is never mathematically justified.
  4. Please for the love of god just scroll up and read what I actually wrote in that first post and respond to it. Or don’t. You clearly seem to be entirely uninterested in a serious conversation. I assume you have an emotional attachment to MWI without even having read Everett’s papers and getting too defensive that you refuse to engage seriously in anything I say, so I am ending this conversation here.
• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨I'm good, thanks⁩ ⁨⁨6⁩ ⁨hours⁩ ago⁩:
  1. Not sure what this first point means. To describe decoherence you need something like density matrix notation or Liouville notation which is mathematically much more complicated. For example, a qubit’s state vector grows by 2^N, but if you represent it in Liouville notation then the vector grows by 4^N. It is far more mathematically complicated as a description. Your second point also agrees with me. We know the Born rule is real because we can observe real outcomes on measurement devices, something which MWI denies exists.
  2. This is also true in Copenhagen. Again, if that’s your criterion for locality then Copenhagen is also local.
  3. I think you should read Everett’s papers “‘Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics” and “The Theory of the Universal Wave Function” to see the difference between wavefunctions defined in a relative sense vs a universal sense. You will encounter this with any paper on the topic. I’m a bit surprised you genuinely have never heard of the concept of the universal wavefunction yet are defending MWI?
  4. That quotation does not come one iota close to even having the air of giving the impression of loosely responding to what I wrote. You are not seriously engaging with what I wrote at all.
• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨I'm good, thanks⁩ ⁨⁨7⁩ ⁨hours⁩ ago⁩:

  The Many Worlds interpretation is rather unconvincing to me for many reasons.

  |1| It claims it is “simpler” just by dropping the Born rule, but it is mathematically impossible to derive the Born rule from the Schrodinger equation alone. You must include some additional assumption to derive it, and so it ends up necessarily having to introduce an additional postulate at some point to derive the Born rule from. Its number of assumptions thus always equal that of any other interpretation but with additional mathematical complexity caused by the derivation.

  • arxiv.org/abs/2402.17066

  |2| It claims to be “local” because there is no nonlocal wavefunction collapse. But the EPR paper already proves it’s mathematically impossible for something to match the predictions of quantum theory and be causally local if there are no hidden variables. This is obscured by the fact that MWI proponents like to claim the Born rule probabilities are a subjective illusion and not physically rule, but illusions still have a physical cause that need to be physically explained, and any explanation you give must reproduce Born rule probabilities, and thus must violate causal locality. Some MWI proponents try to get around this by redefining locality in terms of relativistic locality, but even Copenhagen is local in that sense, so you end up with no benefits over Copenhagen if you accept that redefinition.

  • arxiv.org/abs/0706.2661v1
  • arxiv.org/abs/2306.07794

  |3| It relies on belief that there exists an additional mathematical entity Ψ as opposed to just ψ, but there exists no mathematical definition or derivation of this entity. Even Everett agreed that all the little ψ we work with in quantum theory are relative states, but then he proposes that there exists an absolute universal Ψ, but to me this makes about as much sense as claiming there exists a universal velocity in Galilean relativity. There is no way to combine relative velocities to give you a universal velocity, they are just fundamentally relative. Similarly, wavefunctions in quantum mechanics are fundamentally relative. A universal wavefunction does not meaningfully exist.

  • arxiv.org/abs/2012.05712

  |4| You describe MWI as kind of a copying of the world into different branches where different observers see different outcomes of the experiment, but that is not what MWI actually claims. MWI claims the Born rule is a subjective illusion and all that exists is the Schrodinger equation, but the Schrodinger equation never branches. If, for example, a photon hits a beam splitter with a 50% chance of passing through and a 50% chance of being reflected and you have a detector on either side, the Schrodinger equation will never evolve into a state that looks anything like it having past through or it having been reflected. Indeed, even those probabilities I gave you come from the Born rule.

  This was something Einstein pointed out in relation to atomic decay, that no matter how long you evolve the Schrodinger equation, it never evolves into a state that looks anything like decay vs non-decay. If the universe really is just the Schrodinger equation, you simply cannot say that it branches into two “worlds” where in one you see one outcome and in another you see a different outcome, because the Schrodinger equation never gives you that. You would have to claim that the entire world consists of a single evolving infinite-dimensional universal wavefunction that is nothing akin to anything we have ever observed before.

  There is a good lecture below by Maudlin on this problem, that MWI presents a theory which has no connection to observable reality because nothing within the theory contains any observables.

  www.youtube.com/watch?v=us7gbWWPUsA

  Rovelli also comments on it:

  The gigantic, universal ψ wave that contains all the possible worlds is like Hegel’s dark night in which all cows are black: it does not account, per se, for the phenomenological reality that we actually observe. In order to describe the phenomena that we observe, other mathematical elements are needed besides ψ: the individual variables, like X and P, that we use to describe the world. The Many Worlds interpretation does not explain them clearly. It is not enough to know the ψ wave and Schrödinger’s equation in order to define and use quantum theory: we need to specify an algebra of observables, otherwise we cannot calculate anything and there is no relation with the phenomena of our experience. The role of this algebra of observables, which is extremely clear in other interpretations, is not at all clear in the Many Worlds interpretation.
  

  — Carlo Rovelli, “Helgoland: Making Sense of the Quantum Revolution”

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨⁩ ⁨⁨1⁩ ⁨week⁩ ago⁩:

  It’s… literally the opposite. The giant AI models with trillions of parameters are not something you can run without spending many thousands of dollars, and quantum computers cost millions. These are definitely not services that are going to fall into the hands of everyday people. At best you get small AI models.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨How we get to 1 nanometer chips and beyond⁩ ⁨⁨2⁩ ⁨weeks⁩ ago⁩:

  The reason quantum computers are theoretically faster is because of the non-separable nature of quantum systems.

  Imagine you have a classical computer where some logic gates flip bits randomly, and multi-bit logic gates could flip them randomly but in a correlated way. These kinds of computers exist and are called probabilistic computers and you can represent all the bits using a vector and the logic gates with matrices called stochastic matrices.

  The vector necessarily is non-separable, meaning, you cannot get the right predictions if you describe the statistics of the computer with a vector assigned to each p-bit separately, but must assign a single vector to all p-bits taken together. This is because the statistics can become correlated with each other, i.e. the statistics of one p-bit depends upon another, and thus if you describe them using separate matrices you will lose information about the correlations between the p-bits.

  The p-bit vector grows in complexity exponentially as you add more p-bits to the system (complexity = 2^N where N is the number of p-bits), even though the total states of all the p-bits only grows linearly (complexity = 2N). The reason for this is purely an epistemic one. The physical system only grows in complexity linearly, but because we are ignorant of the actual state of the system (2N), we have to consider all possible configurations of the system (2^N).

  The exponential complexity arises from considering what physicists call an “ensemble” of individual systems. We are not considering the state of the physical system as it currently exists right now (which only has a complexity of 2N) precisely because we do not know the values of the p-bits, but we are instead considering a statistical distribution which represents repeating the same experiment an infinite number of times and distributing the results, and in such an ensemble the system would take every possible path and thus the ensemble has far more complexity (2^N).

  This is a classical computer with p-bits. What about a quantum computer with q-bits? It turns out that you can represent all of quantum mechanics simply by allowing probability theory to have negative numbers. If you introduce negative numbers, you get what are called quasi-probabilities, and this is enough to reproduce the logic of quantum mechanics.

  You can imagine that quantum computers consist of q-bits that can be either 0 or 1 and logic gates that randomly flip their states, but rather than representing the q-bit in terms of the probability of being 0 or 1, you can represent the qubit with four numbers, the first two associated with its probability of being 0 and the second two associated with its probability of being 1. Like normal probability theory, the numbers have to all add up to 1, being 100%, but because you have two numbers assigned to each state, you can have some quasi-probabilities be negative while the whole thing still adds up to 100%.

  Indeed, with that simple modification, the rest of the theory just becomes normal probability theory, and you can do everything you would normally do in normal classical probability theory, such as build probability trees and whatever to predict the behavior of the system.

  However, this is where it gets interesting.

  As we said before, the exponential complexity of classical probability is assumed to merely something epistemic because we are considering an ensemble of systems, even though the physical system in reality only has linear complexity. Yet, it is possible to prove that the exponential complexity of a quasi-probabilistic system cannot be treated as epistemic. There is no classical system with linear complexity where an ensemble of that system will give you quasi-probabilistic behavior.

  As you add more q-bits to a quantum computer, its complexity grows exponentially in a way that is irreducible to linear complexity. In order for a classical computer to keep up, every time an additional q-bit is added, if you want to simulate it on a classical computer, you have to increase the number of bits in a way that grows exponentially. Even after 300 q-bits, that means the complexity would be 2^N = 2^300, which means the number of bits you would need to simulate it would exceed the number of atoms in the observable universe.

  In practice, this increase in complexity does not mean you can always solve problems faster. The system might be more complex, but it requires clever algorithms to figure out how to actually translate that into problem solving, and currently there are only a handful of known algorithms you can significantly speed up with quantum computers.

  For reference: arxiv.org/abs/0711.4770

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨The Road to Quantum Teleportation⁩ ⁨⁨3⁩ ⁨weeks⁩ ago⁩:

  If you have a very noisy quantum communication channel, you can combine a second algorithm called quantum distillation with quantum teleportation to effectively bypass the quantum communication channel and send a qubit over a classical communication channel. That is the main utility I see for it. Basically, very useful for transmitting qubits over a noisy quantum network.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨The Road to Quantum Teleportation⁩ ⁨⁨3⁩ ⁨weeks⁩ ago⁩:

  The people who named it “quantum teleportation” had in mind Star Trek teleporters which work by “scanning” the object, destroying it, and then beaming the scanned information to another location where it is then reconstructed.

  Quantum teleportation is basically an algorithm that performs a destructive measurement (kind of like “scanning”) of the quantum state of one qubit and then sends the information over a classical communication channel (could even be a beam if you wanted) to another party which can then use that information to reconstruct the quantum state on another qubit.

  The point is that there is still the “beaming” step, i.e. you still have to send the measurement information over a classical channel, which cannot exceed the speed of light.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨What's it going to take to truly stop the US?⁩ ⁨⁨3⁩ ⁨weeks⁩ ago⁩:

  Obvious answer is that the USA is the world’s largest economy while Russia is not, so if USA says “if you trade with Russia then you can’t trade with me” then most countries will happily accept ceasing trade with Russia to remain in the US market but if Russia says the same about the USA then people would just laugh and go trade with the USA.

  The only country that might have some leverage in sanctioning the US is China but China has historically had a “no allies” policy. Chinese leadership hate the idea of that because then they would feel obligated to defend them and defending another country is viewed very poorly in Chinese politics. They thus only ever form trade relations and never alliances, meaning if your country is attacked they have no obligation to you. Chinese politicians may verbally condemn the attack but they won’t do anything like sanctions or even provide their own military support in return.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨Insider trading, but make it worse⁩ ⁨⁨3⁩ ⁨weeks⁩ ago⁩:

  Bad people don’t die. The more evil you absorb the longer you live. Like Kissinger living to 100.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨a real danger of quantum computing⁩ ⁨⁨3⁩ ⁨weeks⁩ ago⁩:

  Trying to think of classical models to explain the EPR paradox kinda misses the point of the EPR paradox, because the point of the EPR paradox is to assume that there is indeed nothing linking the two particles until you look to then show you that this leads to a contradiction with Einstein’s definition of locality.† You can indeed trivially think of classical explanations to explain the EPR paradox and how the +1 and -1 particles might be linked and predetermined, but that’s not the point of the EPR paper which is to explore what happens if we don’t make this assumption.

  The paper that instead explores what happens if we do assume they are predetermined is Bell’s theorem, and Bell’s theorem is more complicated than just assuming that the particles are entangled and opposites such that one will be measured to be +1 and the other to be -1. Bell’s theorem shows that the behavior of the individual particle can be dependent upon the configuration of a collection of measurement devices, even if the particle only ever interacts with one measurement device in the collection. That not only violates Einstein’s definition of locality, but if you try to make it deterministic, it ends up violating special relativity as well.

  The simplest demonstration of this is with three particles in the GHZ experiment. The point is, again, not merely that the particles have correlated values but that (1) those values are statistically dependent upon the configuration of the measurement device and (2) the values for an individual particle can be statistically dependent upon the configuration of a collection of measurement devices even if it never interacts with most of the devices in the collection.

  † “Locality” is used in two different senses in the literature. One is relativistic locality which means nothing can travel faster than light. The other is what I like to call coordinate locality which is what Einstein had in mind with the EPR paper, which is the idea that things have to locally interact to become dependent upon one another. The EPR paper is a proof by contradiction that quantum mechanics without hidden variables violates coordinate locality specifically.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨a real danger of quantum computing⁩ ⁨⁨3⁩ ⁨weeks⁩ ago⁩:

  In Copenhagen, “observing” really does just mean “observing” in the colloquial sense, there isn’t a fancy scientific meaning for it as the “collapse” is treated as a subjective update of knowledge and not a physical event.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨If reincarnation exists, suicide could make things much much worse.⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨weeks⁩ ago⁩:

  I tend to agree with people like Wittgenstein, Bohm, Engels, and Benoist, that identities are ultimately socially constructed. Aristotle believed identifies are physically real, so that a tree or a ship physically has an identity of “tree” or a “ship.” But then naturally you run into the Ship of Theseus paradox, but many other kinds of paradoxes of the same sort like Water-H2O paradox or the teletransportation paradox, where it becomes ambiguous as to when this physical identity would actually come into existence and when it goes away.

  The authors that I cited basically argue that identities are all socially constructed. “Things” don’t actually have physical existence. They are human creations.

  One analogy I like to make is that they’re kind of like a trend line on a graph. Technically, the trend line doesn’t add any new information, it just provides a simplified visual representation of the overall data trend of the data, but all that information is already held within the original dataset.

  Human brains have limited processing capacity. We cannot hold all of nature in our head at once, so we simplify it down to simplified representations of overall patterns that are relevant and important to us. We might call that rough collection of stuff over there a “tree” or a “ship.” The label “tree” or “ship” represents an overly simplified concept of some relevant properties of interest about that stuff over there, but if you go analyze that stuff very closely, you may find that the label actually is rather ambiguous and doesn’t capture the fully complexities of that stuff.

  Indeed, if we could somehow hold all of nature in our heads simultaneously, we would not need to divide the world into “things” at all. We would just fully comprehend how it all interacts as a single woven unified whole, and the introduction of any “thing,” any identity, would just be redundant information.

  Indeed, to some extent, it has always been both necessary and proper for man, in his thinking, to divide things up, and to separate them, so as to reduce his problems to manageable proportions; for evidently, if in our practical technical work we tried to deal with the whole of reality all at once, we would be swamped…However, when this mode of thought is applied more broadly…then man ceases to regard the resulting divisions as merely useful or convenient and begins to see and experience himself and his world as actually constituted of separately existent fragments…fragmentation is continually being brought about by the almost universal habit of taking the content of our thought for ‘a description of the world as it is’. Or we could say that, in this habit, our thought is regarded as in direct correspondence with objective reality. Since our thought is pervaded with differences and distinctions, it follows that such a habit leads us to look on these as real divisions, so that the world is then seen and experienced as actually broken up into fragments.

  — David Bohm, “Wholeness and the Implicate Order”

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨Doing the same thing over and over again expecting different results is not the definition of insanity. It's the definition of practice.⁩ ⁨⁨3⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  Putting aside the fact that you cannot “experimentally prove” anything as proof is for mathematics, claiming you can experimentally demonstrate fundamental uncertainty is, to put it blindly, incoherent. Uncertainty is a negative, it is a statement that there is no underlying cause for something. You cannot empirically demonstrate the absence of an unknown cause.

  If you believe in fundamental uncertainty, it would be appropriate to argue in favor of this using something like the principle of parsimony, pointing out the fact that we have no evidence for an underlying cause so we shouldn’t believe in one. Claiming that you have “proven” there is no underlying cause is backwards logic.

  Einstein, of course, was fully aware of such arguments and acknowledged such a possibility, but he put forwards his own arguments as to why it leads to logical absurdities to treat the randomness of quantum mechanics as fundamental; it’s not merely a problem of randomness, but he showed with a thought experiment involving atomic decay that it forces you to have to reject the very existence of an perspective-independent reality.

  There is no academic consensus on how to address Einstein’s arguments, and so to claim he’s been “proven wrong” is quite a wild claim to make.

  “[W]hat is proved by impossibility proofs is lack of imagination.” (John Bell)

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨A lot of people make the mistake of thinking they have real life plot armour⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  Quantum immortality is crackpot quantum woo pseudoscience.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  A double-standard is not inherently a bad thing. It’s a double-standard that we allow trained and licensed medical doctors to do operations on people but not bozos without any medical background, but one would have to be an imbecile to say this double-standard is a bad thing. It is indeed a double-standard to not show empathy to people who support industrial scale genocide to themselves be merked while believing we should show empathy to the victims and to people who do not advocate for such things when they die, but it is a good double-standard. It’s completely ridiculous to think we should be applying a single universal standard to everyone because people are not all the same.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  Bullet-proof vest wouldn’t have saved him as he was sniped in the neck. The head is a moving target and harder to hit, which is why the less professional sniper missed Trump, he tried to shoot him in the head and Trump happened to move his head at that very second, and aiming for center of mass can be risky in case they are wearing something bullet proof. The neck is clearly exposed and more stable of a target than the head. The sniper knew what they were doing.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  Literally right-wingers 24/7 are praising political violence, calling for the eradication of all Palestinians, glorifying the gunning down or running over of protestors, praising the murder of homeless people, praising the execution of minorities by cops, constantly glorifying the suicide rate of trans people, etc. Literally you can go on Twitter and find any of these right-wing accounts crying about how we shouldn’t glorify violence and read their post history and you will likely not even have to go back more than 1 day to find them glorifying violence.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  I have seen so many right wingers post something along the lines of “leftists are so psychotic for being happy he was killed, we should kill all leftists in response!”

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  The interference pattern disappears if anything becomes entangled with the which-way information at all. You can replace the entire measurement device with a single particle that interacts with the particles at the slits in such a way that it becomes perfectly correlated with the which-way information that the observer has no awareness of (such as if a moat of dust interacts with the particle because the experimenter did not isolate it well) and that is sufficient for the interference pattern to disappear.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨Too soon?⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  It comes across to me as they simply lack empathy for other “kinds” of people. If you actually felt the same pain and empathy when watching the video of Kirk get merked, you should feel that a thousand times over when seeing a thousand videos of the IOF massacring children, many sniped in the same way Kirk got merked, and then you should look upon Kirk in disgust for supporting that and dehumanizing the Palestinian people. But the fact is these people don’t. They don’t see other “kinds” of people different from them as in fact “people.” Let’s be real, they don’t feel the same kind of empathy for Palestinian fathers dying as they do a white fascist dying. They constantly mock the deaths of minority groups like trans people. They suddenly have empathy and demand pacifism and valuing the sanctity of all life when a white fascist dies, but are silent in every other cas.e

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  They don’t even explain it in physics class. That is kind of the schtick of the Copenhagen interpretation. You just assume as a postulate that systems are in classical states when you look at them and in quantum states when you do not, and from those two assumptions you can prove using Gleason’s theorem that the only possible way the former can map onto the latter is through the Born rule. But there is no explanation given at all as to how or when or by what mechanism this transition actually takes place.

  Many Worlds isn’t much better because they posit that the classical world does not even exist, yet that clearly contradicts with what we directly observe in experiments, so if that is true it necessarily means that the classical world is an illusion, and so then you still have to explain how the illusion comes about, which they do not. Dropping the postulate that there is indeed a classical world also disallows you from deriving the Born rule through Gleason’s theorem, and so it then becomes unclear how to do it at all without some arbitrary additional postulate, and the arbitrary nature of it means there are dozens of proposals of different postulates and no way to decide between them.

  Modern physics is of the form (1) there is a classical state, (2) you look at it, (3) a miracle happens, (4) you perceive a quantum state, and then you are repeatedly gaslit into believing quantum mechanics is a complete theory of nature and it’s impossible for there to ever be anything more fundamental than it and any physicist who thinks there might be, even if they are literally Albert Einstein, is a crank crackpot.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨A conundrum⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  They are NOT looking to see if you are responsible with money. They are looking to see if they can make money off of you, so they want you to be a heavy credit user. Before I bought my house I made sure to take out two credit cards and just buy random shit on them for a few months because that boosts my credit score drastically which then made it easy to get the loan.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨Scientific unprogress...⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  Periodic table is for atoms. I think you are mixing it up with the standard model, which is for subatomic particles.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨ISO 26300⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  I would do my work in Open Office at home, save it to doc/docx, then when it is entirely completed, I will bring it to the library to load it in Word on a library computer and correct any formatting issues and resave it.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨Misogyny or something... Idk⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  it’s hard for us male gays, always being made fun of 😔

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨xkcd #3134: Wavefunction Collapse⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  That’s the thing, though. Einstein’s interpretation did not require a “miracle” because his interpretation was merely to believe quantum mechanics is incomplete because we don’t currently fully understand “what happens down there.” It was more of a statement of “I don’t know” and “we don’t have the full picture” rather than trying to put forward a full picture. Most people agree that GR is merely an approximation for a more fundamental theory and there is a lot of work on speculative models to potentially replace it one day, like String Theory or Loop Quantum Gravity. But it has become rather taboo to suggest that maybe quantum mechanics is not the most fundamental “final” theory either and that maybe potential speculative replacements for it should be studied as well.

  Those were the kinds of things that interested Einstein in his later years. He had published a paper “Does Schrodinger’s Wave Mechanics Completely Determine the Motion of a System, or Only Statistically?” where he proposed an underlying model similar to pilot wave theory, although later retracted it because it was later showed to him to be nonlocal and he hoped to get rid of then nonlocal aspect of it. He had published a paper earlier titled “Does Field Theory Offer Possibilities for the Solution of the Quantum Problem?” in which he had hoped to figure out if you could use an overdetermined system of differential equations to restrict the possible initial configurations of the system such that it would not be physically possible for the experimenter to choose the initial conditions of the experiment freely. If he was still alive today, he would probably take interest in the works of people like Gerard 't Hooft.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨xkcd #3134: Wavefunction Collapse⁩ ⁨⁨4⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  My issue with the orthodox interpretations is not that they are random but that they contain miracles. This was John Bell’s original criticism that people seem to have forgotten. The Copenhagen interpretation says that there is a quantum world until you look, then a miracle happens, and you have a classical result, but it does not tell you at all how this process actually works. The Many Worlds Interpretation, which is the second most popular, just denies that the classical world made up of observable particles in 3D space where experiments actually have outcomes does not actually exist and is a grand illusion created by the conscious mind, but also cannot explain how this illusion can possibly come about and just says it has something to do with consciousness. They just punt the miracle over to neuroscience and ultimately do not answer anything either. A lot of people think Einstein wasn’t the biggest of quantum mechanics due to the randomness, but if you actually read his works, he was clear the issue was that it does not give you a coherent complete picture of reality, so he just thought it was incomplete, an approximation of a more fundamental theory that we have yet to discover.

• ⁨Comment⁩ on ⁨Not stealing⁩ ⁨⁨5⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago⁩:

  Well if there was public daycare to take the stress off of parents who couldn’t deal with it then it wouldn’t be as big of an issue.