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BitLocker encryption broken in less than 43 seconds with sub-$10 Raspberry Pi Pico — key can be sniffed when using an external TPM

⁨769⁩ ⁨likes⁩

Submitted ⁨⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago⁩ by ⁨throws_lemy@lemmy.nz⁩ to ⁨technology@lemmy.world⁩

https://www.tomshardware.com/pc-components/cpus/youtuber-breaks-bitlocker-encryption-in-less-than-43-seconds-with-sub-dollar10-raspberry-pi-pico

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Comments

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  • CyberSeeker@discuss.tchncs.de ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    When using an external TPM. Which next to no one does.

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    • Shadow@lemmy.ca ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      Watch the video. It just means external to the CPU, not an external device.

      They demo the attack on a Lenovo laptop in the first minute of the video.

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      • Lazarus@kbin.social ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        Many systems still use discrete tpms. Just because the CPU has a virtual tpm function doesn’t mean it’s used

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      • throws_lemy@lemmy.nz ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        fTPM has a bug, don’t know if it’s fixed

        techspot.com/…/93684-amd-promises-fix-ftpm-issue-…

        Veracrypt also doesn’t recommend using encryption that relies on TPMs

        Some encryption programs use TPM to prevent attacks. Will VeraCrypt use it too? No. Those programs use TPM to protect against attacks that require the attacker to have administrator privileges, or physical access to the computer, and the attacker needs you to use the computer after such an access. However, if any of these conditions is met, it is actually impossible to secure the computer (see below) and, therefore, you must stop using it (instead of relying on TPM).

        If the attacker has administrator privileges, he can, for example, reset the TPM, capture the content of RAM (containing master keys) or content of files stored on mounted VeraCrypt volumes (decrypted on the fly), which can then be sent to the attacker over the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local drive (from which the attacker might be able to read it later, when he gains physical access to the computer).

        veracrypt.eu/en/FAQ.html

        Let’s assume the attackers were law enforcers

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    • Toes@ani.social ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      It’s fairly common in business devices before 8th gen Intel.

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    • Shurimal@kbin.social ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      The MSI mini-PC-s for office/business use have separate TPM modules on their mobos. I wouldn't be surprised if other mfg-s do this too.

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  • Overgrowngoblin@lemmy.world ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    Hi this is BitLockPickingLawyer here and today we’ll see how secure . . .

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    • neutron@thelemmy.club ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      A click out of one… two is binding…

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  • peopleproblems@lemmy.world ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    Very end of the article explains you need access to the TPM communication hardware, which no longer occurs external to Intel and And cpus

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    • massive_bereavement@kbin.social ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      To *newer Intel and AMD cpus and only certain models.

      There's a lot of current hardware that uses embedded TPMs. It also depends on the communication path between the CPU and the module, but chances are it will be clear text and in some, via LPC.

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      • Rooter@lemmy.world ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        *pretty much all AMD and Intel cpus made after 2015, not sure how a decade is new.

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    • SpaceMan9000@lemmy.world ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      Should be noted that if a password is asked to decrypt the drive it also doesn’t work.

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    • amenotef@lemmy.world ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      So offline bitlocker drives

      And online bitlocker drives used with AMD fTPM are excluded from this exploit?

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  • tias@discuss.tchncs.de ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    I thought the point with the TPM was that the keys would be kept internally to the TPM at all times and that any data lanes would only be used for transferring payload. Why are they sending keys between the TPM and the CPU?

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    • Squire1039@lemm.ee ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      There are some functions like that, like Passkey signing. For Bitlocker, the encryption/decryption key is transferred to the CPU (and RAM) in order for it to operate. The problem described here has been around for a while, but putting it on a key like that makes the attack method available to “everyone”. There has been a solution for a while too: 1) put in pre-boot Bitlocker PIN, and 2) use integrated TPM like the article mentions.

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  • fmstrat@lemmy.nowsci.com ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    Say it with me now: LUUUUUKS

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    • baseless_discourse@mander.xyz ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      LUKS is still vulnerable to this attack if you enable autodecrypt using TPM.

      This attack is based on the vulnerability that the CPU and TPM communicates uses plain text. This attack is not new:

      dolosgroup.io/…/from-stolen-laptop-to-inside-the-…

      SPI is a communication protocol for embedded systems and is extremely common amongst virtually all hardware. Due to its simplicity, there is no encryption option for SPI. Any encryption must be handled by the devices themselves. At the time of this writing BitLocker does not utilize any encrypted communication features of the TPM 2.0 standard, which means any data coming out of the TPM is coming out in plaintext, including the decryption key for Windows

      And apparently Linux is not doing too hot on this regard either:

      As we can see, parameter encryption simply isn’t used in practice, and except for safeboot none of the solutions enforce PIN/MFA by default.

      secura.com/…/tpm-sniffing-attacks-against-non-bit…

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      • phoenixz@lemmy.ca ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        CPU communicates with TPM in plaintext

        Because of course

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    • HelloHotel@lemm.ee ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      I wondered why LUUUUKS didnt use the TPM, why do i have to put my password in… this is absolutely why.

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      • cooopsspace@infosec.pub ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        Also yes you can, I wouldn’t recommend it though.

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      • mlaga97@lemmy.mlaga97.space ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        What exactly is the point of full disk encryption if the system auto-unlocks on boot?

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  • chairman@feddit.nl ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    Question: if I have an bitlocker encrypted SSD in a modern computer with embedded TPM, can I move this SSD to an old computer with external TPM to sniff the cod this way? Be gentle. I am dumb. Thanks.

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    • SleepingTower@lemmy.world ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      “Sniff the cod” This is a typo right? I don’t know any better, but I had a good laugh.

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      • chairman@feddit.nl ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        What about the salmon and the halibut? :-D

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    • jmfwnsfw@lemmynsfw.com ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      Not unless you entered your recovery code to unlock it on the old computer with the external tpm.

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    • Bitflip@lemmy.ml ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      Nope. As soon as you move the disk to your second system/TPM, you lose any ability to decrypt it at all.

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      • baseless_discourse@mander.xyz ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        unless you have the key?

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    • Neon@lemmy.world ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      The Key is stored on the Internal TPM. Only it can unlock the SSD.

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  • smileyhead@discuss.tchncs.de ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    Solution: Just encrypt it with a password.

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    • BaroqueInMind@kbin.social ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      Bit locker is a password controlled drive encryption. Am I being dumb or are you seriously saying that?

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      • tias@discuss.tchncs.de ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        I guess they mean use the password as part of the encryption key

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      • Kraven_the_Hunter@lemmy.dbzer0.com ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        Yes.

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  • Petter1@lemm.ee ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    Finally, we can install Linux on your corporate pc or grab some RAM from it 😂😂😂

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  • massive_bereavement@kbin.social ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    It seems to me an evolution on this attack: https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2021/08/how-to-go-from-stolen-pc-to-network-intrusion-in-30-minutes/

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  • MagneticFusion@lemm.ee ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago
    [deleted]
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    • Shadow@lemmy.ca ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      You’re being downvoted because this is a hardware problem and not Microsoft’s fault.

      Just look at the Xbox one mod chip scene and you’ll see MS can do security perfectly well.

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      • refurbishedrefurbisher@lemmy.sdf.org ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        Yeah. I hate Microsoft as a company, and I hate how they inject advertising, inconsistent design, no good centralixed package manager (TBF, they’re fixing that with winget, but only kind of; not sure if there’s a way to add additional repositories), etc.

        But they do have damn good security. After the OG Xbox became the legendary homebrew console that it did, Microsoft beefed up security massively with the Xbox 360’s software. What they didn’t do quite as well was beef up hardware security, although the last model of the Xbox 360 (Winchester) has yet to be hacked. The JTAG hack was patched with a firmware update, but then it was found that through a timed glitching attack, you could force memcmp to return true, and if the timing is off, you can reboot the console via glitcher chip or SMC if using RGH 3 and try again.

        With the Xbox One, there was a priviledge escillation bug in Dev Mode that to this day has been pretty underutilized, but other than that, it’s been fairly rock solid. There is another point to why, though. Microsoft realised the power of homebrew, especially after Sony made the mistake of removing OtherOS from all PS3 models, and then it got hacked shortly after. So they included (sold you) a way to run UWP apps using a sandboxed environment called Dev Mode. This leaves less of a desire for hackers to attempt exploiting the console’s retail mode, since they have almost the same resources that games have (still weaker, though).

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      • brbposting@sh.itjust.works ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

        Don’t know anything about that scene, has it ever been cracked?

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    • throws_lemy@lemmy.nz ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

      You are not really wrong, TPM was designed by the Trusted Computing Group consisting of big tech companies like M$, IBM, AMD, Intel, Cisco and HP.

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  • Rooter@lemmy.world ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    Lol, Tom’s hardware is allowed on lemmy? It’s like the fox news of the tech world.

    Clickbait as usual.

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  • VampyreOfNazareth@lemm.ee ⁨1⁩ ⁨year⁩ ago

    Them government backdoors. Mkay trust us mkay

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