The whole drama seems to be pushing for Electron’s safeStorage API, which uses a device’s secrets manager. But aren’t secrets stored there still accessible when the machine is unlocked anyway? I’m not sure what this change accomplishes other than encryption at rest with the device turned off.
Signal downplays encryption key flaw, fixes it after X drama
Submitted 4 months ago by dvdnet62@feddit.nl to technology@lemmy.world
Comments
eager_eagle@lemmy.world 4 months ago
priapus@sh.itjust.works 4 months ago
Yeah they are, this problem is super overblown. Weirdly I’ve seen articles about this coming up for other apps too, like the ChatGPT app for MacOS storing conversation history in plain text on the device. Weird that this is suddenly a problem.
If someone wants better security, the can use full disk encryption and encrypt their home directory and unlock it on login.
woelkchen@lemmy.world 4 months ago
This is like the third time in the past two months I’ve seen someone trying to spread FUD around Signal.
If any other messenger had the same issue, Moxie Marlinspike and fans would have an outcry on biblical proportions.
whostosay@lemmy.world 4 months ago
They do
mp3@lemmy.ca 4 months ago
Security comes in layers, still better than storing the keys in plaintext.
GamingChairModel@lemmy.world 4 months ago
But aren’t secrets stored there still accessible when the machine is unlocked anyway?
I think the OS prevents apps from accessing data in those keychains, right? So there wouldn’t be an automated/scriptable way to extract the key in as easy of a way.
eager_eagle@lemmy.world 4 months ago
But that’s the thing: I haven’t found anything that indicates it can differentiate a legitimate access from a dubious one; at least not without asking the user to authorize it by providing a password and causing the extra inconvenience.
If the wallet asked the program itself for a secret - to verify the program was legit and not a malicious script - the program would still have the same problem of storing and retrieving that secret securely; which defeats the use of a secret manager.
douglasg14b@lemmy.world 4 months ago
Yes but it pushes it to an operating system level and that means everyone wins as the operating system solutions to improve as vulnerabilities are found and resolved.
You also don’t need rce access to exfiltrate data. If decrypted keys are held in memory, that mitigates an entire class of vulnerabilities from other applications causing your private chats from leaking.
eager_eagle@lemmy.world 4 months ago
Full disk encryption is not a solution here. Any application that’s already running which can provide read only file system access to an attacker is not going to be affected by your full disk encryption.
that’s my point
OfficerBribe@lemm.ee 4 months ago
Windows Recall had the same issue with data storage.
NicoCharrua@lemmy.ca 4 months ago
Microsoft was claiming that the data would be inaccessible to hackers (which is not true).
Signal claimed the exact opposite: that once it’s on your computer, messages can be seen by malicious programs on your computer.
Signal was caught having less than ideal security. Microsoft was caught lying.
OfficerBribe@lemm.ee 4 months ago
Could not find much info about that claim, but context probably was that data is not possible to be accessed without compromising device, e.g., not possible to get info over network or by compromising some central location on remote server because there is none and all that data is stored locally.
eager_eagle@lemmy.world 4 months ago
let me just highlight that if someone has access only to your signal desktop conversations, they have access to your signal desktop conversations.
if someone has access to your windows recall db, they have access to your signal desktop conversations, the pages you’ve browsed including in private windows, documents you’ve written, games you’ve played, social media posts you’ve seen, and pretty much anything you’ve done using that machine.
perhaps that does demand a slightly different level of concern.
OfficerBribe@lemm.ee 4 months ago
True that Recall collects more than Signal, but copying actual files, browser session cookies / passwords, mailbox content if desktop mail client is used makes more sense if you have access to device. Recall is also not supposed to collect data from private sessions from popular web browsers. I assume for that it uses some hard coded list of exceptions with an option to add your own.
Both should have protected that kind of data with additional safeguards so that merely copying that data without authentication would have no value.
pewgar_seemsimandroid@lemmy.blahaj.zone 4 months ago
xz? twitter? x11? placeholder?
Tja@programming.dev 4 months ago
It’s an equation. One of those “left for the reader”. Please start solving it.
dinckelman@lemmy.world 4 months ago
[deleted]unexposedhazard@discuss.tchncs.de 4 months ago
It wasnt a serious security flaw, arguable not one at all. So they are perfectly justified in downplaying the hysteria.
spiderman@ani.social 4 months ago
the point is they could have fixed it by the time it was reported and not waited around until the issue was blown bigger.
timewarp@lemmy.world 4 months ago
A company that requires using a phone number prides itself in security?
eager_eagle@lemmy.world 4 months ago
privacy != anonymity != security
9tr6gyp3@lemmy.world 4 months ago
Whats the vulnerability with Signal and phone numbers?
quantumcog@sh.itjust.works 4 months ago
I understand Signal’s stance on this. For this vulnerability, the attacker needs physical access to computer. If the attacker has already gained physical access, the attacker can already access your messages, crypto wallets, password managers. Many password managers also have this flaw. For example, Someone can change Keepass master password if the user is already logged in to the session, if they have physical access to the PC and lock you out of all your accounts.
thurstylark@lemm.ee 4 months ago
Yeah, this is why I added a hardware key to my db. The hardware key is required not just for reading the db, but writing to it as well.
Another tip: use something like an OnlyKey that has its own locking and self-destruct mechanisms so this method isn’t foiled by simply acquiring the key.
uiiiq@lemm.ee 4 months ago
They don’t need physical access (hold the device in their hand), they just need a command execution, which is a much lower bar. I expect some defence in depth for an application that holds some of the most private information there is about me.
quantumcog@sh.itjust.works 4 months ago
The argument still holds. If they have remote execution access, they already have your data. Encryption can’t protect your data here because encrypted data will automatically become unencrypted once the user logs in.
partial_accumen@lemmy.world 4 months ago
This seems like easy fix is available. On Windows, Access Shadow copies, restore previous version from $DayBeforeLockout. Or on Linux, specific file systems have automatic volume level snapshotting available. Or on either…restore the keepass file from a backup before the change.
quantumcog@sh.itjust.works 4 months ago
Yeah, I know about this. That’s why backups are so important.