Comment on Lawsuit Alleges That WhatsApp Has No End-to-End Encryption
pressanykeynow@lemmy.world 2 hours agoWhat if the malicious actor is not Signal but Google or the hardware manufacturer?
Can we check that the encryption key generated by the device is not stored somewhere on the device? Same for the OS.
Can we check that the app running in memory is the same that is available for reproducible build checks?
Can we check that your and my apps at the moment are the same as the one security researchers tested?
just_another_person@lemmy.world 2 hours ago
The clients (apps) enforce key symmetry for your own keys, server identity, and the exchanged with the other person part of a conversation. Constantly. There is no way to MITM that.
The clients are open source, and audited regularly, and yes, builds are binary reproduceable and fingerprinted on release.
That’s not to say someone can’t build a malicious copy that does dumb stuff and put it in your phone to replace the other copy, but the server would catch and reject it if it’s fingerprints don’t match the previously known good copy, or a public version.
Now you’re just coming up with weird things to justify the paranoia. None of this has anything to do with Signal itself, which is as secure as it gets.
pressanykeynow@lemmy.world 2 hours ago
Didn’t I say that at the start of my questions? What’s your point?
If I understand you correctly, you mean that Signal app checks itself and sends the result to the server that can then deny access to it? Is that what Signal does and what makes it difficult to spoof this fingerprint?
I don’t think you answered any of my questions though since they weren’t about Signal.
I’m just asking questions about security I don’t know answers to, I’m not stating that’s how things are.