
utzer@f.utzer.de
@utzer@f.utzer.de@f.utzer.de
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago:
- Submitted 1 week ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 0 comments
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago: @tom_s guck mal in den Ausgangspost, es waren 50000 Requests in 5 Minuten. Mit den geblocken UA geht es jetzt ja super.
- Submitted 1 week ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 0 comments
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago:
@tom_s Danke für die Hinweise. Ich habe das jetzt in einer kurzen Stichprobe getestet:
- UA-Filter vorübergehend deaktiviert
- Anubis auf DEBUG gestellt
- separates TLS-Light-Logging in Nginx aktiviert
Ergebnis für den angeblichen Android-6-/Chrome-65-Client:Requests: 13 Unterschiedliche IPs: 13 Challenges ausgestellt: 11 Challenges gelöst: 0Die 13 Verbindungen ergaben zunächst zwölf verschiedene TLS-Profile. Die Unterschiede bestanden allerdings ausschließlich aus zufälligen GREASE-Werten. Nach deren Normalisierung hatten alle Verbindungen exakt dasselbe TLS-Profil.
Der TLS-Fingerprint allein eignet sich trotzdem nicht für eine sichere Sperre: Dasselbe normalisierte Profil wurde in der Stichprobe auch von aktuellen Chrome-142-, Chrome-148- und Chrome-149-Clients verwendet.
Die Kombination ist jedoch eindeutig verdächtig: Der User-Agent behauptet
Android 6 / Chrome 65, verwendet aber einen modernen TLS-1.3-/HTTP/2-Stack und über alle IP-Adressen hinweg dasselbe vollständige HTTP-Headerprofil.Auch der User-Agent
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; crawler)löste keine seiner zwölf Challenges.Der aktuelle Flood verbraucht in dieser Stichprobe also hauptsächlich Anubis-Ressourcen und gelangt nicht bis zu Forgejo.
UA-Filter und normales Anubis-Logging sind inzwischen wieder aktiv.
- Submitted 1 week ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 0 comments
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago:
Further update: I have replaced the temporary path-specific rate limit with an exact User-Agent filter.
The ten evenly rotated browser identities responsible for 96.79% of the Anubis challenges, plus the explicit `Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; crawler)` identity, are now rejected by Nginx before reaching Anubis or Forgejo.
The pull-request and issue pages are available normally again, regular web and Git access remain unaffected, and backend load is close to zero.
The crawler has since introduced a new identity:
Android 6 / Nexus 5 / Chrome 65This identity produced 527 requests from 526 different IPv4 addresses within one hour, confirming the rotating proxy-network pattern. However, the overall volume reaching Anubis has dropped from roughly 35,800 challenges per hour at the peak to about 1,000 per hour, so the exact filtering is currently working very well.
This remains a temporary mitigation because User-Agent strings can be changed at any time.
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago:
@tom_s Es ist tatsächlich ein neuer dominanter User-Agent nachgerückt:
Android 6 / Nexus 5 / Chrome 65In einer Stunde kamen damit 527 Requests von 526 unterschiedlichen IPv4-Adressen. Das sieht also weiterhin nach demselben rotierenden Proxy-Netz aus.
Das Headerprofil hat sich allerdings geändert:
vorher:
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
jetzt:Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5Priority:
u=0, iist gleich geblieben, wird aber auch von echten Browsern verwendet. Darauf kann ich daher nicht sauber filtern.TLS wird bereits im Reverse-Proxy-Nginx terminiert. Anubis sitzt dahinter und erhält nur noch normales HTTP. Anubis kann in diesem Aufbau deshalb keine TLS-/JA3-Fingerprints ermitteln. Dafür müsste ich den ClientHello vor der TLS-Terminierung am Nginx separat erfassen.
- Submitted 1 week ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 0 comments
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago:
@tom_s Anubis hält dem Ansturm gar nicht Stand. Das Setup ist so, dass der Reverse Proxy das aufiltern muss, Anubis kommt erst danach, dann der Dienst.
Ich schau mal es dann neue UA gibt.
- Submitted 1 week ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 0 comments
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago: @tom_s du meinst die 50000 IPs aus verschiedenen Netzen, die auf der Welt verteilt sind, sind doch rückführbar auf einen Client? Ich schaue mir morgen nochmal ein paar Details an.
- Submitted 1 week ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 0 comments
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago:
@tom_s aber sind das nicht alles echt alte UA, also wenn ich die blocke was kann das für Nebeneffekte haben? Firefox 119 oder 120 ist doch echt alt.
Aber ich schaue morgen nochmal ob ich es weiter optimieren kann.
- Submitted 1 week ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 0 comments
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago: @pasjrwoctx and it works!
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago: @pasjrwoctx thanks, that is not what I will try, but just realized I can block the top10 or top11 user-agents and this will block 95% of this bullshit access.
- Submitted 1 week ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 0 comments
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago:
More details regarding user-agent distribution
Retained log window: 2026-08-14 17:50–22:42 CEST
Challenge requests: 164,435
Distinct user-agent strings: 160
Share represented by the top ten: 96.79%The almost perfectly even distribution among the first ten identities is particularly striking.
COUNT USER AGENT ------ ------------------------------------------------------------ 16106 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/118.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 16097 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:120.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/120.0 15993 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:121.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/121.0 15959 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/119.0.0.0 15924 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 15914 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 15899 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 15887 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/120.0.0.0 15855 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:121.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/121.0 15800 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 2871 Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; crawler) 709 Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/148.0.7778.0 Safari/537.36 413 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/144.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 86 Chrome/135.0.0.0 — Windows 40 Chrome/116.0.0.0 — Windows 40 Chrome/107.0.0.0 — Windows 39 Chrome/148.0.0.0 — macOS 34 Chrome/150.0.0.0 — Windows 33 Chrome/131.0.0.0 — Windows 32 Chrome/133.0.0.0 — Windows 25 Edge/135.0.0.0 — Windows 24 Chrome/146.0.0.0 — macOS 23 Chrome/145.0.0.0 — Windows 23 Chrome/110.0.0.0 — Windows 22 Chrome/126.0.0.0 — Linux 22 Chrome/123.0.0.0 — macOS 21 Chrome/146.0.0.0 — Windows 21 Chrome/109.0.0.0 — Windows 21 Chrome/136.0.0.0 — macOS 20 Chrome/99.0.4844.51 — Windows 20 Chrome/149.0.0.0 — Windows 20 Chrome/145.0.0.0 — macOS 19 Chrome/133.0.0.0 — macOS 18 Chrome/105.0.0.0 — Windows 17 Chrome/134.0.0.0 — Windows 17 Chrome/111.0.0.0 — Windows 17 Safari/15.3 — macOS 17 Chrome/131.0.0.0 — macOS 16 Edge/99.0.1150.30 — Windows 16 Chrome/104.0.5112.81 — Windows 16 Firefox/135.0 — macOS 16 Safari/18.0 — macOS 16 Safari/15.5 — macOS 15 Chrome/100.0.4896.75 — Windows 15 Chrome/149.0.0.0 — macOS 14 Firefox/137.0 — Windows 14 Chrome/147.0.0.0 — Windows 14 Chrome/124.0.0.0 — Windows 14 Chrome/117.0.0.0 — Windows 14 Chrome/112.0.0.0 — Windows 14 Chrome/108.0.0.0 — Windows 14 Chrome/101.0.4951.67 — Windows 14 Safari/26.0 — macOS 14 Safari/17.0 — macOS 14 Chrome/124.0.0.0 — macOS 13 Chrome/104.0.0.0 — Windows 13 Safari/18.4 — macOS 13 Chrome/150.0.0.0 — macOS 12 Firefox/133.0 — macOS 12 Chrome/135.0.0.0 — macOS 11 Chrome/148.0.0.0 — Windows 11 Chrome/103.0.0.0 — Windows 10 Edge/101.0.1210.47 — Windows 10 Safari/18.3.1 — macOS 10 Chrome/134.0.0.0 — macOS 9 Chrome/106.0.5249.119 — Windows 9 Chrome/147.0.0.0 — macOS 8 Chrome/142.0.0.0 — Windows 7 Firefox/137.0 — Ubuntu Linux 7 Firefox/125.0 — Linux 7 Chrome/132.0.0.0 — Linux 7 Chrome/151.0.0.0 — Windows 7 Chrome/130.0.0.0 with CCleaner — Windows 7 Chrome/139.0.0.0 with Safari WebKit string — macOS 6 Chrome/137.0.0.0 — Linux 6 Chrome/114.0.0.0 — Linux 6 Firefox/153.0 — Windows 6 Edge/151.0.0.0 — Windows 5 Chrome/131.0.0.0 — Linux 5 Chrome/134.0.0.0 — ChromeOS 5 Chrome/106.0.0.0 — Windows 5 Chrome/128.0.0.0 — macOS 5 Chrome/151.0.0.0 — Android 4 Firefox/136.0 — Ubuntu Linux 4 Chrome/129.0.0.0 — Linux 4 Firefox/140.0 — Windows 4 Firefox/135.0 — Windows 4 Chrome/138.0.0.0 — Windows 4 Edge/136.0.0.0 — Windows 4 Chrome/129.0.0.0 — Windows 4 Safari/17.6 — macOS 4 Safari/17.5 — macOS 4 Chrome/147.0.0.0 — Android 3 Chrome/136.0.0.0 — Linux 3 Chrome/130.0.0.0 — Linux 3 Chrome/124.0.0.0 — Linux 3 Chrome/133.0.0.0 — ChromeOS 3 Obsidian/1.8.10, Electron/34.2.0 — Windows 3 Chrome/58.0.3029.110 — Windows 3 Edge/138.0.0.0 — Windows - Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago:
@pasjrwoctx Thanks, I checked the user agents. The pattern looks highly coordinated.
Out of 164,435 Anubis challenge requests, there were only 160 distinct user-agent strings. The top ten account for 96.79% of all requests and were used almost perfectly evenly:
- Firefox 120 / Windows — 16,066
- Chrome 118 / Windows — 16,052
- Firefox 121 / macOS — 15,949
- Edge 119 / Windows — 15,917
- Chrome 119 / Windows — 15,874
- Chrome 119 / macOS — 15,872
- Edge 120 / Windows — 15,863
- Chrome 120 / macOS — 15,853
- Firefox 121 / Windows — 15,812
- Chrome 120 / Windows — 15,761
These are old browser versions from around 2023. Combined with almost one IP per request, this looks like a single coordinated tool rotating through a fixed list of spoofed browser identities and a very large residential/proxy network. It does not prove whether the objective is scraping or disruption, but it is clearly not ordinary independent crawling.
- Submitted 1 week ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 0 comments
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago: is there anyone who can help to figure out if this is a huge scraping or a DDoS?
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 1 week ago:
Update: The flood is still ongoing and intensified again today.
Between approximately 17:50 and 22:03 CEST, Anubis recorded at least 141,090 challenges from 136,393 different IP addresses, peaking at roughly 35,800 challenges per hour.
Most of the current traffic is still targeting the friendica-addons pull-request list. Our temporary rate limit is successfully keeping this traffic away from the backend: the rest of git.friendi.ca remains fast and accessible, normal Git access works, and server load is currently back to normal.
The affected pull-request page may continue to return “Too Many Requests” while the flood persists.
- Comment on Another massive distributed HTTP flood is currently hitting git.friendi.ca a 2 weeks ago: As a temporary measure, we have limited access only to the pull-request and issue-list pages currently receiving most of the traffic. The rest of git.friendi.ca should now be available again, and normal Git access is unaffected. The affected list pages may still show “Too Many Requests” while the flood continues.
- Submitted 2 weeks ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 33 comments
- Comment on Sorry for the slow responses from git.friendi.ca this evening. There was 2 weeks ago: @agowa338Ich bin nicht sicher wie viele Zugriffe es in der Zeit gab, aber an die 500.000.
RE: chaos.social/users/agowa338/st… - Comment on Sorry for the slow responses from git.friendi.ca this evening. There was 2 weeks ago: @agowa338 den anderen Beitrag hatte ich gelöscht, war wahrscheinlich nicht nötig, war vielleicht nur eine Schluckauf vom Server wegen dem Scraper DDoS.
- Submitted 2 weeks ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 3 comments
- Comment on wer ist denn eig. der Admin der Forgejo Instanz, die könnte ein wenig Liebe vert 3 weeks ago: @tealk hmm hab ich was falsches gelesen... ok.
- Submitted 3 weeks ago to helpers@forum.friendi.ca | 0 comments