Comment on Signal downplays encryption key flaw, fixes it after X drama

• eager_eagle@lemmy.world ⁨2⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago

  But that’s the thing: I haven’t found anything that indicates it can differentiate a legitimate access from a dubious one; at least not without asking the user to authorize it by providing a password and causing the extra inconvenience.

  If the wallet asked the program itself for a secret - to verify the program was legit and not a malicious script - the program would still have the same problem of storing and retrieving that secret securely; which defeats the use of a secret manager.

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  • GamingChairModel@lemmy.world ⁨2⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago

    I haven’t found anything that indicates it can differentiate a legitimate access from a dubious one

    It’s not about legitimate access versus illegitimate access. As I understand it, these keychains/wallets can control which specific app can access any given secret.

    It’s a method of sandboxing different apps from accessing the secrets of other apps.

    In function, browser access to an item can be problematic because browsers share data with the sites that it visits, but that’s different from a specific app, hardcoded to a specific service being given exclusive access to a key.

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    • eager_eagle@lemmy.world ⁨2⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago

      upon reading a bit how different wallets work, it seems macos is able to identify the program requesting the keychain access when it’s signed with a certificate - idk if that’s the case for signal desktop on mac, and I don’t know what happens if the program is not signed.

      As for gnome-keyring, they ackowledge that doing it on Linux distros this is a much larger endeavor due to the attack surface:

      An active attack is where the attacker can change something in your security context. In the context of gnome-keyring an active attacker would have access to your user session in some way. An active attacker might install an application on your computer, display a window, listen into the X events going to another window, read through your memory, snoop on you from a root account etc.

      While it’d be nice for gnome-keyring to someday be hardened against active attacks originating from the user’s session, the reality is that the free software “desktop” today just isn’t architected with those things in mind. We need completion and integration things like the following. Kudos to the great folks working on parts of this stuff:

      - Trusted X (for prompting)
      - Pervasive use of security contexts for different apps (SELinux, AppArmor)
      - Application signing (for ACLs) 
      

      We’re not against the goal of protecting against active attacks, but without hardening of the desktop in general, such efforts amount to security theater.

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  • AProfessional@lemmy.world ⁨2⁩ ⁨months⁩ ago

    You are absolutely correct. This can help in a world where every app is well sandboxed (thus can be reliably identified and isolated).

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