See, that’s a trap that keeps the argument within a frame where you can win. That’s not how it works.
What you’re doing is focusing on a singular solution, and then showing why it can’t solve all the problems. Each individual solution is attacked on its own, and then nuclear ends up being the only option.
Except that’s a dumb way of going about it.
Each of these solutions has pros and cons. You use the pros of ones to cover the cons of another.
As one example I mentioned elsewhere in the thread, Brazil has an HDVC line 2400km long. With that kind of reach, solar in Arizona can power Chicago, wind in Nebraska can power New York, and every single existing hydro dam along the way can provide storage. What you end up with is the possibility of not needing to build a single MWh of new storage or hydro dams. If nothing else, you don’t need very much.
I’ll leave you with an excerpt from “No Miracles Needed”, written by Mark Z Jacobson, a professor of civil and environmental engineering:
On July 11, 2011, I was invited to a dinner at the Axis Café and Gallery in San Francisco to discuss the potential of renewable energy as an alternative to natural gas hydrofracking in New York State. Little did I know it at the time, but that dinner would set off a chain reaction of events that turned a scientific theory, that the world has the technical and economic ability to run on 100 percent clean, renewable energy and storage for all purposes, into a mass popular movement to do just that. The movement catalyzed an explosion of worldwide country, state, and city laws and proposed laws, including the Green New Deal, and business commitments. Ten years after that meeting, critics were no longer mocking our ideas as pie-in-the-sky and tooth-fairy-esque. They were no longer claiming that transitioning to more than 20 percent renewables would cripple power grids. Instead, the discussion had changed to what is the cost of 100 percent renewables, how fast can we get there, and should we leave a few percent for non-renewables?
This was from the first edition of the book published in 2023. So quite contrary to your claim that “there’s no practical way to build domestic batteries with this capacity using the technology of 2025”, the technology has existed for over a decade. We just need to build it. And we are building it, just not as fast as we need to.
Meanwhile, the NRC continues to stamp permits for new nuclear, but nobody is building. There’s a reason for that, too.
I can dismiss the the other solutions that are worse then pumped hydro because pumped hydro is actually the best case scenario for grid-level storage and it requires A LOT of space. Anything else, batteries, pneumatic mines etc etc are going to be worse in terms of space by orders of magnitude, not to mention the actual costs. Hand waving the need for grid-level storage by saying we would us hydro shows you don’t understand the scale of the problem.
That excerpt from that engineer is great, but WHERE IS THE STORAGE? Show it to me on a map. You can’t because it does not exist. New Nuclear plants are being built, finally, but there is a reason that no grid-level storage exists. It’s literally not possible today. There exists a pilot battery plant in Australia, and there exists a few megawatts of storage in Scotland, but these are few and far between and none of them are suitable for massive deployment.
I can dismiss the the other solutions that are worse then pumped hydro because pumped hydro is actually the best case scenario for grid-level storage and it requires A LOT of space.
It’s like you didn’t even read the bit about how HVDC makes this a non-issue.
. . . but WHERE IS THE STORAGE? Show it to me on a map. You can’t because it does not exist.
It’s in every hydro dam that’s already built in between Arizona and New York. If we even do need more, there is plenty of land to use.
How about this: I throw out everything I said about synergizing different solutions. We just have solar and storage. No long distance transmission or wind. How much does that cost to power a city?
That study has been done. Going by Lazard’s levelized cost of energy 2025 report, the most optimistic cost to build new nuclear is $141/MWh–and keep in mind that I’m giving nuclear the best case scenario here. A solar+storage solution that would provide 97% of the power needed for Las Vegas would cost $104/MWh. “But that’s sunny desert with lots of empty land around it”, I hear you say. The bigger deal is that Washington DC could have 81% of power done at $124/MWh. Northern city where it snows a lot, and it’s still more viable than nuclear.
“But 81% isn’t 100%”. No, please stop. You get to 81% before you get to 100%. This isn’t even the best way to get to 100%.
This study has a comprehensive wind/water/solar solution fighting with two arms tied behind its back, and it’s still kicking nuclear’s ass.
. . . New Nuclear plants are being built, finally
Nope, not in the US, they aren’t.
Here’s a map of NRC licenses. The green pips are the ones where licenses are already approved. Here’s the list and where they are at:
William States - Licensed to go ahead in 2016. Canceled in 2017 with a contributing factor being the bankruptcy of Westinghouse (which itself happened because of cost overruns at the Vogtle nuclear plant build)
Turkey Point - Licensed new builds in 2018. No news on actually going forward.
North Anna - Licensed new builds in 2017. No news on actually going forward.
PSEG - Issued an early site permit, but not the full license. The ESP was set in 2016 with no movement noted since then.
Fermi - This was licensed just in the past few months. They want to have it in operation by 2032, which, lol, no it isn’t.
That’s not a list of success stories. Add the Vogtle debacle to the list and it’s all a bucket of failure.
The AP1000 design at Vogtle was supposed to prevent the need for botique engineering that had been a problem with reactors in the past. You could use one design everywhere. That was hoped to prevent all these cost and schedule overruns. It didn’t. In addition to Vogtle, it was also built in China at the Sanmen and Haiyang plants. Like Vogtle, Sanmen went over budget and over schedule, but managed in the end. There’s less information about what happened at Haiyang, but the timeline of beginning construction and reaching first criticality is roughly the same as Sanmen; we can assume it went about the same.
There’s a very clear reason why this is happening, and it comes down to this chart:
This is a list of megaprojects and their tendency to go overbudget. Everything from rail to mining to airports. The third worst budgetary offender is nuclear power at a mean cost overrun of 120%. It managed to be better than Olympic Games, at least. The very worst is the related issue of nuclear storage at a whopping 238% mean budget overrun.
Way down at the bottom, you will find solar, power transmission, and wind. Solar projects have a mean overrun of 1%, energy transmission 8%, and wind 13%.
That should make it very clear why the list above has approved licenses with no actual movement. Who the hell would want to put their money into that? You can invest in wind or solar, have a very good chance of it staying within budget, and it will be making revenue within 6-12 months. You put that in nuclear, and you better hope that other investors will pitch in when the budget doubles, or else you have to do it if you hope to see your money again. In the very best case scenario, you’re not going to see a cent of revenue for at least 5 years, but probably more like 10.
Meanwhile, old nuclear is being taken offline because it’s too expensive. If it’s not even worthwhile to keep what we have, what hope is there for building new?
PowerCrazy@lemmy.ml 2 weeks ago
Show it. Tell me where the grid-level storage exists for a city like Tokyo, or NYC, or Chicago, or Mexico City. Where is it?
frezik@lemmy.blahaj.zone 2 weeks ago
See, that’s a trap that keeps the argument within a frame where you can win. That’s not how it works.
What you’re doing is focusing on a singular solution, and then showing why it can’t solve all the problems. Each individual solution is attacked on its own, and then nuclear ends up being the only option.
Except that’s a dumb way of going about it.
Each of these solutions has pros and cons. You use the pros of ones to cover the cons of another.
As one example I mentioned elsewhere in the thread, Brazil has an HDVC line 2400km long. With that kind of reach, solar in Arizona can power Chicago, wind in Nebraska can power New York, and every single existing hydro dam along the way can provide storage. What you end up with is the possibility of not needing to build a single MWh of new storage or hydro dams. If nothing else, you don’t need very much.
I’ll leave you with an excerpt from “No Miracles Needed”, written by Mark Z Jacobson, a professor of civil and environmental engineering:
This was from the first edition of the book published in 2023. So quite contrary to your claim that “there’s no practical way to build domestic batteries with this capacity using the technology of 2025”, the technology has existed for over a decade. We just need to build it. And we are building it, just not as fast as we need to.
Meanwhile, the NRC continues to stamp permits for new nuclear, but nobody is building. There’s a reason for that, too.
PowerCrazy@lemmy.ml 2 weeks ago
I can dismiss the the other solutions that are worse then pumped hydro because pumped hydro is actually the best case scenario for grid-level storage and it requires A LOT of space. Anything else, batteries, pneumatic mines etc etc are going to be worse in terms of space by orders of magnitude, not to mention the actual costs. Hand waving the need for grid-level storage by saying we would us hydro shows you don’t understand the scale of the problem.
That excerpt from that engineer is great, but WHERE IS THE STORAGE? Show it to me on a map. You can’t because it does not exist. New Nuclear plants are being built, finally, but there is a reason that no grid-level storage exists. It’s literally not possible today. There exists a pilot battery plant in Australia, and there exists a few megawatts of storage in Scotland, but these are few and far between and none of them are suitable for massive deployment.
frezik@lemmy.blahaj.zone 2 weeks ago
It’s like you didn’t even read the bit about how HVDC makes this a non-issue.
It’s in every hydro dam that’s already built in between Arizona and New York. If we even do need more, there is plenty of land to use.
How about this: I throw out everything I said about synergizing different solutions. We just have solar and storage. No long distance transmission or wind. How much does that cost to power a city?
That study has been done. Going by Lazard’s levelized cost of energy 2025 report, the most optimistic cost to build new nuclear is $141/MWh–and keep in mind that I’m giving nuclear the best case scenario here. A solar+storage solution that would provide 97% of the power needed for Las Vegas would cost $104/MWh. “But that’s sunny desert with lots of empty land around it”, I hear you say. The bigger deal is that Washington DC could have 81% of power done at $124/MWh. Northern city where it snows a lot, and it’s still more viable than nuclear.
“But 81% isn’t 100%”. No, please stop. You get to 81% before you get to 100%. This isn’t even the best way to get to 100%.
This study has a comprehensive wind/water/solar solution fighting with two arms tied behind its back, and it’s still kicking nuclear’s ass.
Nope, not in the US, they aren’t.
Here’s a map of NRC licenses. The green pips are the ones where licenses are already approved. Here’s the list and where they are at:
That’s not a list of success stories. Add the Vogtle debacle to the list and it’s all a bucket of failure.
The AP1000 design at Vogtle was supposed to prevent the need for botique engineering that had been a problem with reactors in the past. You could use one design everywhere. That was hoped to prevent all these cost and schedule overruns. It didn’t. In addition to Vogtle, it was also built in China at the Sanmen and Haiyang plants. Like Vogtle, Sanmen went over budget and over schedule, but managed in the end. There’s less information about what happened at Haiyang, but the timeline of beginning construction and reaching first criticality is roughly the same as Sanmen; we can assume it went about the same.
There’s a very clear reason why this is happening, and it comes down to this chart:
energyskeptic.com/…/Why-large-projects-fail-Flyvb…
This is a list of megaprojects and their tendency to go overbudget. Everything from rail to mining to airports. The third worst budgetary offender is nuclear power at a mean cost overrun of 120%. It managed to be better than Olympic Games, at least. The very worst is the related issue of nuclear storage at a whopping 238% mean budget overrun.
Way down at the bottom, you will find solar, power transmission, and wind. Solar projects have a mean overrun of 1%, energy transmission 8%, and wind 13%.
That should make it very clear why the list above has approved licenses with no actual movement. Who the hell would want to put their money into that? You can invest in wind or solar, have a very good chance of it staying within budget, and it will be making revenue within 6-12 months. You put that in nuclear, and you better hope that other investors will pitch in when the budget doubles, or else you have to do it if you hope to see your money again. In the very best case scenario, you’re not going to see a cent of revenue for at least 5 years, but probably more like 10.
Meanwhile, old nuclear is being taken offline because it’s too expensive. If it’s not even worthwhile to keep what we have, what hope is there for building new?
It’s not a matter of regulation, either. The industry would really like it to be, but they’ve been putting their thumb on that scale for a while now. Even with that, nobody wants to finance this shit.
It’s not just that nuclear is expensive. It’s a boneheaded thing to drop money into at all.