Comment on Replacement for Docker Content Trust (DCT)

thelittleblackbird@lemmy.world ⁨1⁩ ⁨day⁩ ago

• maltfield@slrpnk.net ⁨1⁩ ⁨day⁩ ago

  Because the hash comes from the same source as the image itself.

  So if someone compromised the publishing infrastructure (or does a MITM attack), they can trivially maliciously modify the hash as easily as they can maliciously modify the image. It provides zero security to Publishing Infrastructure compromise.

  A good historical example of this happening was when monero’s release infrastructure was comprimised once. And here’s a great list of historically relevant cases where this happened:

  • github.com/cncf/tag-security/tree/…/compromises

  In the case of Monero, the users were able to verify that the cryptographic hash on the release was invalid, and it was fixed very fast. If the user can only check checksums, they have literally no way to detect if the publishing infrastructure or a MITM attack is taking place.

  original

  • thelittleblackbird@lemmy.world ⁨1⁩ ⁨day⁩ ago

    Got it, I thought it was a last segment attack (image substition) but now I see you are aiming to a fully supply chain attack.

    And if you find an nswer to that, please let me know because this things have virtually not a solution that ticks all boxes

    original