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“Our family nightmare began on June 3”, Sylvia Zin recalls before a congressional hearing in Washington. “The call came from a Chinese number. The person on the line told me that my husband, Min Zin, was in custody and the Ministry of State Security in Yunnan was conducting an investigation. When I tried to clarify what that meant, the line went dead.”

Today, more than 100 days later, Min Zin, a Burmese American scholar, remains detained in China […] Min Zin is a founder and the Executive Director of Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar), an independent think tank with a dedicated China Studies Desk. His institution conducts open-source research and data on the relationships between China and Myanmar, including detailed analyses on Beijing’s influence on Myanmar politics and, most recently, rare-earth mining linked to exports to China.

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Chinese authorities said, “Min Zin is suspected of spying and endangering Chinese national security.” His family and colleagues rejected this allegation. ISP-Myanmar condemned what it described a groundless accusation and said that Min Zin traveled to China for the sole purpose of attending an academic workshop. The United States government also rejected Beijing’s account and called Min Zin’s imprisonment a case of wrongful detention.

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The case exposes an uncomfortable reality. When a foreign researcher whose work involves critical assessment on China will face significant risks when entering the mainland, where Beijing draws an increasingly blurred and intolerant line between academic inquiry, political analysis and national security, particularly when dealing with its critics.

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Over the past decade, the People’s Republic of China has drastically taken action against its critics abroad. According to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), China has committed highest number of transnational repression cases globally: 319 since 2014. These cases are based on publicly documented incidents with a verifiable record. The actual scale may be bigger.

Beijing has orchestrated an extensive system of intimidation abroad, blending official state organs with a network of quasi-state associations and diaspora groups according to a 2015 study of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom. China´s quasi-state associations range from cultural and educational networks to more opaque entities, sometimes referred to as “overseas police stations”. Together, the network exerts pressure on dissidents, human rights advocates and pro-democracy activists often through subtle coercion, sometimes through direct threats or kidnapping. In the most severe cases, the families of activists face warnings or retaliation inside China, a powerful form of leverage in communities where family ties remain deeply rooted.

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A 2022 investigation by the nonprofit Safeguard Defenders identified over 100 covert Chinese police overseas police stations operating in more than 50 countries. The findings drew international attention because they raised questions about whether Beijing was carrying out law-enforcement activities on foreign soil. Governments have subsequently investigated or taken action against overseas Chinese police stations. In June 2026, French counterintelligence services reported shutting down Chinese overseas police stations, which had operated under the guise of community and business associations. They were found monitoring members of the Chinese diaspora to gather intelligence and exert pressures on dissidents residing abroad.

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A researcher can conduct politically sensitive work while living outside China, where Beijing’s ability to exercise direct legal control is limited. Once that researcher enters China, the relationship between researcher and state changes. The question is no longer simply what the researcher did abroad. It becomes what Chinese authorities can characterize as a violation of Chinese law once the person is within Chinese jurisdiction.

Laws without borders?

China’s Counterespionage Law makes this analysis more realistic. Article 4 of the Counterespionage law, defines “acts of espionage” broadly, covering not only traditional espionage but also obtaining or providing state secrets and intelligence, cooperating with “so-called” espionage organizations, certain cyber activities, assisting hostile forces, and other conduct deemed to threaten China’s national security. Importantly, the law also applies to conduct carried out outside the borders of the People’s Republic of China, including activities conducted abroad by agencies, organizations, individuals or other collaborators when they are considered to endanger China’s national security.

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