I don’t think there’s any reason why Oakes’ recollection of McBride’s intent trumps what McBride has publicly said about his intent. Doesn’t the court have a word for that?

It seems fairly logical to me. He had the personal experience of witnessing soldiers unfairly scapegoated by superiors. His substantiation for the unfairness is that those superiors were complicit in war crimes. That the motive was there for superiors to make false specific allegations of misconduct in order to sweep systemic issues under the rug.

If McBride were a perfect witness, he’d have been motivated enough by war crimes to speak up. But the doubt about his awareness of what he was exposing is an appeal to authority which flies in the face of Occam’s razor.

Simply, whistleblowing as a means of recourse only became preferable after his fellow soldiers, whom made the same choice he personally did to sacrifice their normal lives to enlist, presumably with virtuous intent i.e in Australia’s name, were effectively betrayed by their own.

That might leave something to be desired about his morals, but this must be considered in context, and “not whistleblowing” isn’t something that could reasonably be prosecuted. Oakes is right to conclude that our military personnel should have been more closely monitored in general. That doesn’t speak to the specific conduct of the soldiers McBride aimed to exonerate, though.