That’s literally it. It sends a cert for amazon.com, that your client trusts, because the CA cert used to sign it is in your trusted store.
the proxy sends a cert to the client saying ‘I’m Amazon’, and the client believes it
Thanks, could you explain this a bit more? I didn’t understand what you mean by “sends a cert saying ‘I’m Amazon’”
SheeEttin@lemmy.world 11 months ago
MigratingtoLemmy@lemmy.world 11 months ago
I see, thanks for the explanation. Amazon sends the certificate to the proxy, and the proxy sends its own certificate, masquerading as amazon, to the user.
Thanks
canni@lemmy.one 11 months ago
I think it’s important to understand how a typical SSL certificate is generated. Basically, there are a handful of companies that we have all agreeded to trust. When you download Chrome it comes with a set of trusted root certificates, so does your OS, etc. So when Amazon wants to create an SSL for amazon.com, the only way they can do that is by contacting one of those handful of trusted companies and getting them to issue a certificate that’s says Amazon.com. When you go to the site, you see a trusted party generated the cert and your browser is happy.
When you create a new root certificate and install it on your computer, you become one of those companies. So now, you can intercept traffic, decrypt it, read it, reissue a certificate for amazon.com (the same way Amazon would have gotten one from the third parties), reencrypt it, and pass it along to the client. Because the client trusts you it’s still a valid certificate. But if you inspect the certificate on the client side the root signer will no longer be GoDaddy or whatever, it will be you.
MigratingtoLemmy@lemmy.world 11 months ago
Basically, if I were to run a CA locally (on my network) and use that certificate in some OS, I should be able to set up a MiTM setup easily. Except that applications like web browsers don’t care and will utilise certificate pinning anyway, regardless of which certificates I keep in my certificate store in the OS.
Also, let’s say I’m running HAProxy/Caddy/NGINX at home which acts as my SSL-termination point for my network. In this case, if a service wants to access the internet, do these reverse proxies encrypt the outbound traffic with a different certificate?
losttourist@kbin.social 11 months ago
Yes, I think that 'masquerading' is the key bit to grasp. The MITM Proxy isn't just intercepting the traffic, it alters the traffic as it passes through.
MigratingtoLemmy@lemmy.world 11 months ago
Thanks, got it!
ShellMonkey@lemmy.socdojo.com 11 months ago
A decrypting proxy acts like a local certificate authority and issues a certificate on behalf of the site to create one encrypted connection between the client and proxy while creating a second on with the original site on the other side.
The client will get an error (or depending on the site and browser may refuse to connect at all in the case of pinned and pteloaded certificates) indicating that they’re connecting to a site with a certificate from an untrusted issued unless they’ve been configured to trust the CA held on the proxy.
The ‘break’ between the client side connection and the server side connection will be in plaintext and can be examined through internal tools or sent to external ones typically through ICAP.
MigratingtoLemmy@lemmy.world 11 months ago
I see. Which would mean that in cases where the application/OS can be made to blindly trust the “fake” CA (by inserting a root certificate into the certificate store, like in Android), the proxy can simply send the certificate and the client will believe that the certificate comes from Amazon. The certificate list can be refreshed by flushing the cache, yes?
Thanks for the explanation
stifle867@programming.dev 11 months ago
There are some cases where this would not work by the way. It’s called certificate pinning and it’s basically when an application comes with the trusted certificate for a host built-in. Even if you were to override it with a root certificate in the certificate store, the app simply wouldn’t use it.
MigratingtoLemmy@lemmy.world 11 months ago
Shouldn’t flushing the cache mitigate this problem?
ShellMonkey@lemmy.socdojo.com 11 months ago
That’s the sum of it. Like others and I have noted some mobile apps (and Apple phones in particular have their entire OS configured to not trust any intercepted certs when attempting to speak to Apple home base) are prone to using certificate pinning and will reject the intercepted certs regardless of the trust store. It’s mostly beneficial for adjusting the browser.
If I might ask, what’s the purpose of this proxy? Functionally there are a lot simpler and more efficient ways to block traffic from a phone. If it’s more for traffic inspection I’ve seen a couple VPN based pcap apps for Android that could get a lot more detail while a DNS filter could both control and give visibility to traffic from the device without all the cert hassles.
MigratingtoLemmy@lemmy.world 11 months ago
Thanks, I didn’t realise that certificate pinning was this strict.
This effort is to check if my mobile has a baseband processor that might be communicating with the internet. I want to know if my device has a backdoor in hardware. The idea with a VPN has me intrigued, could you tell me more about that?