The deterrent might work temporarily until the challenge pattern is recognised, but there’s no actual protection here, just obscurity.
Anubis uses a proof-of-work challenge to ensure that clients are using a modern browser and are able to calculate SHA-256 checksums. Anubis has a customizable difficulty for this proof-of-work challenge, but defaults to 5 leading zeroes.
Please tell me how you’re gonna un-obscure a proof-of-work challenge requiring calculation of hashes.
scrubbles@poptalk.scrubbles.tech 1 day ago
That’s counting on one machine using the same cookie session continuously, or they code up a way to share the tokens across machines. That’s now how the bot farms work
deffard@lemmy.world 1 day ago
It will obviously depend heavily on the type of bot crawling, but that is not hard coordination for harvesting data for LLM’s, as they will already have strategies to prevent nodes all crawling the same thing - a simple valkey cache can store a solved JWT.
scrubbles@poptalk.scrubbles.tech 23 hours ago
but the vast majority of crawlers don’t care to do that. That’s a very specific implementation for this one problem. I actually did work at a big scraping farm, and if they encounter something like this,they just give up. It’s not worth it to them. That’s where the “worthiness” check is, you didn’t bother to do anything to gain access.