Comment on Passkeys Explained: The End of Passwords
Septimaeus@infosec.pub 22 hours ago
Thanks for the great article! I had a question re: the top disadvantage you mention (lock-in).
Background: Although the on-device integration for Apple, Google, etc. use their cloud for E2E sync between devices, it appears KeePassXC using their passkey interception, discovery, and import procedures accomplish the same cross-device passkey implementation without needing a particular vendor cloud lock-in. As best I can tell, this meets the original standard’s sync fabric requirements (whether or not the big providers like it) and relies on platform-specific APIs mostly for interoperability.
Question: If KeePass has been able to implement their own sync this way, and the FIDO standard accommodates non-OS providers (e.g. browsers or PW managers), what is currently the biggest technical hurdle remaining for FOSS-based passkey providers?
sentientRant@lemmy.world 19 hours ago
Thank you… and Yes you are right… There could be many reasons like greed or could be risk management if you think from both ends of spectrum. It’s sad actually they are developed on the same FIDO2 but insists on being seperate which is weird… Also they feel that regular user wouldn’t be able to set up FOSS passkey provider or may be they lose control over encryption if they share with third party.
Septimaeus@infosec.pub 16 hours ago
Yeah the counter-interoperability of the proprietary expansions on the FIDO standards sounds very much like embrace extend extinguish to me. I know engineering standards generally require field revisions but these big corps have a track record of this behavior.
I can see how the FIDO standard’s dID requirement might be an issue at the org level, but even in the case of a fully custom/unknown rooted device they have provisions for using traditional security keys attached to one or more associated devices via USB/BT/NFC. Megacorp platforms might be first to facilitate adoption but the spec absolutely accommodates open provider integration.
I need to experiment with personal security passkey registration and authentication workflows to know how difficult it actually is in practice, but it looks like the equivalent of self-signed certificates are possible anywhere the user controls the stack like self-hosted intranetwork suites that are popular around here.
Thanks again for the write up!