Comment on "Pilot had to dive aggressively to avoid midair collision over Burbank airport."
Rivalarrival@lemmy.today 1 week agoJust to put this into perspective, here’s a visualization of the flight data. The two aircraft were never on a collision course. They slightly violated a 5-mile separation requirement: their closest point of approach was 4.85 miles. The pilot did need to respond to the TCAS alert, but that alert was very conservative.
neatchee@lemmy.world 1 week ago
These conservative warnings exist for a reason, though. That being hundreds of lives at stake. What I think would be now interesting is to hear how often these types of events occurred before and after the layoffs at the FAA
Rivalarrival@lemmy.today 1 week ago
Agreed. The point of a conservative warning is to give plenty of time and opportunity to react without bouncing your passengers off the ceiling.
Fault for the loss of separation seems to be on the controllers. Not all separation incidents are the same, though. This one seems to be rather minor. By my estimation, the encroachment was a maximum of 264 yards, and the duration of that encroachment (without pilot or controller intervention) would have been less than 10 seconds. Too tight, yes. It needs addressed so it doesn’t become a habitual violation that could lead to more severe encroachment by these controllers. But there was no real danger of bodily harm from this encroachment.
Fault for an overly aggressive maneuver is on the pilot. There was a risk of injury from that overly aggressive response. The pilot’s actions elevated a minor, no-risk event to one that risked serious injury to the passengers and crew. But, he was following instructions from a device designed to improve aviation safety, and the nature of the warnings from that device, an over-response is much safer than an under-response. He has to trust his instruments, and his instruments (erroneously) told him to push the nose down, quickly, lest he hit another plane.
TCAS is designed and intended to reduce risk and prevent harm. In this specific incident, though, it seems like the TCAS-RA actually increased the risk of harm, by calling for an immediate action that wasn’t actually necessary to prevent harm. Is there a way to improve TCAS?
I, too, would like to know how often TCAS incidents were recorded before and after the layoffs. Those layoffs definitely harmed aviation safety. But if someone were injured in this incident, I don’t think I could point the finger at the controllers or lack thereof. This particular incident seems to suggest a shortcoming in the TCAS system.
neatchee@lemmy.world 1 week ago
Very thoughtful and informed reply. Thank you for sharing your knowledge!